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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL 
CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act' (ECOA) was enacted in 
19742 to prohibit discrimination based on sex or marital status by 
creditors against credit applicants.3 In 1976, the ECOA was 
amended to expand the list of prohibited discriminatory criteria• 
and to strengthen the enforcement provisions of the original Act. 5 
Pursuant to one of the amendments, the Federal Reserve Board 
promulgated regulations to implement the provisions of the Act, 
known collectively as Regulation B.8 
It is vital that innovative legislation of this type be periodically 
reexamined to discover whether the purposes for which it was 
enacted are being fulfilled. 7 This article will first examine the 
legislative history of the ECOA to discover (1) the impetus for its 
enactment; (2) the views of proponents and opponents of the 
legislation concerning the presence of credit discrimination, its 
proper cure, and the proposed provisions of the bills introduced 
to deal with the problem; and (3) the congressional intent as to 
the use of various credit-granting factors described by the Act.8 
I 15 U,S,C, §§ 1691-1691e (1976). 
1 Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974). 
1 Section 502 of Pub. L. No. 93-495 provides: 
The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the various financial institu-
tions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise their responsibil-
ity to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex or marital status. Economic stabilization would be en-
hanced and competition among the various financial institutions and other firms 
engaged in the extension of credit would be strengthened by an absence of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex or marital status, as well as the informed use of 
credit which_ Congress has heretofore sought to promote. It is the purpose of this 
Act to require that financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension 
of credit make that credit available to all creditworthy customers without regard 
to sex or marital status. 
' The amendments added race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of income 
from public assistance programs, and the good faith exercise of legal rights under the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act as applicant characteristics that creditors could not use 
to discriminate in the granting of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976). 
1 See notes 33-41 and accompanying text infra. 
' 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979). 
' The 1976 amendments to ECOA promote this goal by requiring the Federal Reserve 
Board to make an annual report to Congress on the operation of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691f 
(1976). 
• See Part I infra. 
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Regulation B9 will then be similarly examined to find out how the 
broad mandates of the ECOA have been made concrete for the 
use of creditors.1° Finally, the article will focus on a nationwide 
survey of consumers conducted by the Survey Research Center of 
the University of Michigan, concentrating on questions which 
probe credit refusals and the perceived reasons for such refusals. 
The article will fully describe the survey as well as the model and 
statistical techniques used to interpret the survey results. 11 Those 
results will be utilized to suggest changes in the ECOA and Regu-
lation B so that they better reflect the public policy dictated by 
Congress. 12 
I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 
A. History of the Act: ECOA of 1974 
The problems of sex discrimination in consumer credit transac-
tions first gained widespread public attention in 1972 with publi-
cation of the National Commission on Consumer Finance report 
which concluded that there were "widespread instances of unwar-
ranted discrimination in the granting of credit to women." 13 A 
series of law review articles built upon the Commission's findings 
and proposed various remedies, including federal legislation. 14 
The problem was brought directly to congressional attention in 
two hearings, 15 leading to a Senate report which cited no fewer 
' See note 6 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See Part II infra. 
11 See Part IV infra. 
" See Part VI infra. 
13 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
NCCF REPORT], at 160. The Commission heard testimony which revealed particular 
problems in the following areas: 
(1) Single women have more trouble than single men in obtaining credit. 
(2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit, 
usually in her husband's name. 
(3) Creditors are unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her own 
name. 
(4) Creditors are often unwilling to consider the wife's income when a married 
couple applied for credit. 
(5) Women who are divorced or widowed have trouble reestablishing credit. 
Women who are separated have a particularly difficult time, since the accounts 
may still be in her husband's name. 
Id. at 152-53. 
" See Gates, Credit Discrimination Again.st Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 V AND. 
L. REv. 409 (1974); Littlefield, Sex Based Discrimination and Credit Granting Process, 5 
CONN. L. REv. 575 (1973); Note, The Discredited American Woman: Sex Discrimination 
in Con.sumer Credit, 5 U. CALIF. D.L. REv. 61 (1973); Comment, Women and Credit, 12 
DuQ. L. REv. 863 (1974). 
11 Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic 
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than thirteen common types of credit discrimination based on sex 
and marital status. 18 In light of such evidence, Congress passed 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.17 
The ECOA in 1974 prohibited discrimination by creditors 
"against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status with 
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction, " 18 though inquiries 
into an applicant's marital status were allowed under certain 
conditions. 19 The Federal Reserve Board was empowered to pro-
mulgate appropriate regulations.20 Further provisions assigned 
administrative enforcement duties to several agencies, depending 
on the type of creditor involved, with overall enforcement author-
ity given to the Federal Trade Commission.21 Creditors were made 
Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 
and H.R. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Credit 
Discrimination Hearings]. 
11 S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973). The thirteen types of discrimination 
included the five cited by the NCCF REPORT, see note 13 supra, as well as the following: 
(1) Arbitrary refusal to consider alimony and child support as a valid source of 
income when such source is subject to validation. 
(2) Applying stricter standards to married applicants where the wife rather than 
the husband is the primary supporter for the family. 
(3) Requesting or using information concerning birth control practices in evalu-
ating any credit application. 
(4) Requesting or using information concerning the creditworthiness of a spouse 
where an otherwise creditworthy married person applies for credit as an individ-
ual. 
(5) Refusing to issue separate accounts to married persons where each would be 
creditworthy if unmarried. 
(6) Considering as "dependents" spouses who are employed and not actually 
dependent on the applicant. · 
(7) Use of a credit scoring system that applies different values depending on sex 
or marital status. 
(8) Altering an individual's credit rating on the basis of the credit rating of the 
spouse. 
Id. at 17. 
" Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974). The ECOA became Subchapter 
IV of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691e (1976). 
11 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 701(a), 88 Stat. 1521 (1974). 
11 Such inquiries were allowed "if . . . for the purpose of ascertaining the creditor's 
rights and remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit, and not to discrimi-
nate in a determination of creditworthiness." Id. § 701(b). 
20 Id. § 703, 88 Stat. 1522. 
21 The agencies and persons responsible for enforcing the Act and the type of credit 
institutions each was to oversee were as follows: the Comptroller of the Currency (national 
banks); the Federal Reserve Board (member banks of the Federal Reserve System other 
than national banks); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (nonmember banks 
insured by the FDIC); the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, acting directly or through the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (institutions subject to § 5(d) the Home 
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), § 407 of the National Housing Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 1730 (1976), and§§ 6(i) & 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1426, 1437 (1976)); the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration (fed-
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civilly liable to an aggrieved applicant for any actual damages 
sustained either by an individual acting alone or as a representa-
tive of a class22 as well as for punitive damages, which are limited 
to $10,000 in the case of an individual and to the lesser of $100,000 
or one percent of the creditor's net worth in a class action. 23 Plain-
tiff applicants were also permitted to plead for injunctive reliefl~ 
and actions could be brought in any appropriate federal district 
court within one year of the date of the occurrence of the viola-
tion, without regard to the amount in controversy. 25 
B. History of the Act: ECOA Amendments of 1976 
The convoluted means by which the 1974 Act was passed28 
caused many of the original provisions of legislation introduced 
in the House of Representatives to be omitted. 27 Widespread dis-
era! credit unions); the Interstate Commerce Commission (any common carrier subject 
to "the Acts to regulate commerce"); the Civil Aeronautics Board (any air carrier subject 
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)); the Secretary of Agriculture 
(any creditor subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 181 (1976)); 
the Farm Credit Administration (any federal land bank, federal land bank association, 
or production credit association); the Securities and Exchange Commission (brokers and 
dealers); the Small Business Administration (small business investment companies); and 
the Federal Trade Commission (enforcement not specifically committed by the ECOA to 
some other government agency, regardless of whether the violator "is engaged in com-
merce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act," 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)). Id. § 704, 88 Stat. 1522. This division of enforcement authority 
remained largely the same in the 1976 Act, with the FTC being given the power to enforce 
Federal Reserve Board regulations promulgated under the ECOA as if they were FTC 
regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c. 
12 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 706(a), 88 Stat. 1524 (1974). 
12 Id. § 706(b), (c). 
" Id. § 706(d). 
,. Id. § 706(g). 
n On July 23, 1973, the Senate passed S. 2101, which included amendments to the 
Truth in Lending Act to prohibit discrimination in the granting of credit based on the 
sex or marital status of the applicant. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
Because the House Committee on Banking and Currency had taken no action on that bill 
nearly a year later, Senator Brock offered a nearly identical provision as ari amendment 
to H.R. 11121, the Depository Institutions Amendments of 1974. 120 CoNG. REc. 19209 
(1974). Approved by the Senate, the bill was sent to conference where it was reported out 
favorably. H.R. REP. No. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in (1974] U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6148. A rule forbidding House members from objecting to Senate 
amendments to H.R. 11121 was passed by the House over the strenuous objections of 
Representative Sullivan, the principal sponsor of the original House equal credit bill, H.R. 
14856, who argued that the credit discrimination provisions ofH.R. 11121 inserted by the. 
Senate were too weak. 120 CONG. REc. 34759-60 (1974). The conference report, however, 
was accepted by the House and Senate and the bill was signed into law by President Ford 
on October 28, 1974. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 · 
(1974). 
27 H.R. 14856 had included race, color, religion, national origin, and age together with 
sex and marital status as prohibited bases of discrimination. 1974 Credit Discrimination 
Hearings, supra note 15, at 3. 
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satisfaction with the limited nature of the 1974 Act28 led to the 
introduction of numerous bills in the House and Senate to expand 
coverage of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ECOA. 29 Evi-
dence of discrimination against the elderly30 and nonwhites31 
caused Congress to accept the recommendations of its Conference 
Committee32 and pass the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amend-
ments of 1976.33 
Substantive changes included the addition of age, race, color, 
national origin, religion, receipt of public assistance benefits, and 
the exercise of legal rights under the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act as prohibited criteria in the credit-granting process.34 The 
new law requires creditors to notify "each applicant against 
whom adverse action is taken" of the reasons for such adverse 
action.35 The administrative enforcement provisons were substan-
zs At hearings held in 1975, Representative Frank Annunzio claimed that the 1974 Act 
had been accepted merely to get some form of equal credit legislation on the books, but 
that "this time ... [he was] not willing to settle for legislation that will allow for 
discrimination in any way, shape, or form." Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]. 
21 These bills included H.R. 3386, introduced by Representative Sullivan to cover age, 
race,· and sex discrimination (later changed to H.R. 5616); S. 483, introduced by Senator 
Brock to deal with age discrimination; and S. 1927, introduced by Senator Biden to 
prevent discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, national origin, political affilia-
tion, receipt of public assistance benefits, or the exercise of rights under the law. Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate 
Hearings]. 
so The legislative consultant to the National Retired Teachers Association and the 
American Association of Retired Persons presented evidence, consisting largely of letters 
of complaint received by these organizations, tending to reveal what the consultant called 
"a clear pattern of discrimination against older persons by certain national credit card 
companies, department stores, gasoline companies, banks, and other credit-granting insti-
tutions." 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 73. 
11 The Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission presented evidence 
revealing discrimination against minorities in the granting of mortgage and other credit. 
1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 131-37, 293-99. But see NCCF 
REP<>RT, supra note 13, at 160: "The Commission did not find sufficient evidence to prove 
the hypothesis that there is racial discrimination in the granting of consumer credit." 
12 S. REP. No. 685, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
,. Act of March 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified at 15 U .S.C. 
§§ 1691-1691e (1976)) . 
.. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1976). A creditor may satisfy this obligation either by notify-
ing every applicant of the reasons involved in taking the adverse action or by informing 
every applicant that he or she may request (within sixty days) a statement ofreasons from 
the creditor. Id. "Adverse action" is defined by the statute as "a denial or revocation of 
credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit 
in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested." Not included in the 
term is "a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where 
the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would 
exceed a previously established credit limit." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1976). 
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tially expanded and the FTC was given the power to enforce 
Federal Reserve Board regulations promulgated under the ECOA 
"in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a 
Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule."38 Potential 
civil liability against a creditor in a class action was expanded so 
that punitive damages could not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 
one percent of the creditor's net worth. 37 Furthermore, the 
amendments substituted a two-year limitation for a one-year lim-
itation for bringing of an action under the ECOA.38 
The Attorney General was made a potential enforcer of the 
ECOA by the amendments. If agencies which are responsible for 
administrative enforcement are unable to obtain compliance by 
their own actions, they are authorized to refer the matter to. the 
Attorney General "with a recommendation that an appropriate 
civil action be instituted. "39 The Attorney General may also act 
on his own if "he has reason to believe that one or more creditors 
are engaged in a pattern or practice" in violation of the Act. 40 In 
either case, he may bring a civil action in an appropriate federal 
district court for "appropriate" (including injunctive) relief. 41 
Finally, Congress expanded the reporting responsibilities of the 
Federal Reserve Board from their statutorily mandated annual 
report to Congress under the Truth in Lending Act42 to one on the 
ECOA as well. 43 
C. Congressional Intent: The Balancing of Creditor and Con-
sumer Interests 
1. The competing interests - As amended, the ECOA repre-
sents the conflicting interests inherent in the credit-granting pro-
cess, interests which were made known throughout the Act's 
formative stages. Ascertaining congressional intent involves ex-
amination of all the positions to see how they are meshed in 
ECOA. 
Although many laws at both the state44 and federal 45 levels 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1976). The FTC has begun stricter enforcement of the Board's 
regulations within the past two years. See notes 176-81 and accompanying text infra. 
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976). AP, of October 1979, no class actions involving ECOA had 
reached the trial stage in the federal courts. 
11 15 u.s.c. § 1691e(O (1976). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (1976). 
'° 15 U.S.C. § 1691(h) (1976). For a discussion of recent Justice Department actions 
under this portion of the statute, see notes 182-88 and accompanying text infra. 
" Id. 
u 15 u.s.c. § 1613 (1976). 
" 15 u.s.c. § 1691f (1976). 
" Every state has legislation that governs the amount of interest to be charged when 
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arose during this century to govern the ever-expanding field of 
consumer credit, 48 the decision as to whom credit should be 
granted has traditionally been one for the creditor to make un-
hampered by government regulation. The "three C's of credit" -
the character, capacity, and capital of the applicant - have tra-
ditionally governed the creditor's decision, with differences in 
sex, marital status, age, and race often playing important roles 
in the process. 47 At the congressional hearings on the ECOA, rep-
resentatives of the credit industry fervently argued that the Act 
would destroy the freedom of choice necessary to make rational 
credit-granting decisions, to the detriment of creditors and con-
sumers alike. 48 Particularly troublesome was the Act's proscrip-
tion of "discrimination" in the granting of credit. One writer in 
an industry publication commented: 
Regrettably, the word "discrimination" is susceptible of 
two interpretations, one of which is intended to come 
within the prohibition of the Act - the other being essen-
tial to the survival of the credit business. . . . Any grant 
or denial of credit is by its very nature, discriminatory; 
that is, in order to survive economically, every credit gran-
tor must discriminate between those whom he believes 
will pay their debts and those who will not.49 
Thus, what creditors feared is that the ECOA represented the 
first step on the road toward "automatic" granting of credit to 
the parties to a loan agreement fail to specify the rate of interest. Usury laws, effective in 
nearly every state, specify the maximum legal rate of interest which may be charged. 
States also generally have laws patterned after the Uniform Small Loan Act to govern 
loans not exceeding a statutorily prescribed amount, as well as laws covering practives of 
lending institutions licensed by the state. See generally B. CURRAN, TRENos IN CONSUMER 
CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965). 
" Federal credit laws include the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1772 
(1976), the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1976), and the Truth in 
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1616 (1976). See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 44. 
" The "evolution" of the cash-and-carry society of yesteryear into the credit-dominated 
economy of today is demonstrated by figures available from the Federal Reserve Board. 
At the end of 1939, the total amount of outstanding consumer credit (excluding real estate 
mortgage credit) was $7.2 billion. By the end of 1956, it had grown to $42.3 billion and to 
$69.9 billion by the end of 1963. 50 FED. REs. BULL. 376 (1964). At the end of 1977, that 
figure had grown to a staggering $216.6 billion. 64 FED. RES. BULL. A42 (1978). 
11 M. NEIFELD, NEIFELD's MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 501 (1961). Neifeld labels divor-
cees, Indians living on reservations, and those living in an "untidy home" or a "rundown 
neighborhood" poor credit risks. Id. at 512. 
48 See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 95-112 (statements 
of Thomas A. Haeussler, President of Capital Financial Services, Inc., and Robert Norris, 
General Counsel of the National Consumer Finance Association). 
" Brown, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 1 CREDIT 4, 28 (1975). See also NCCF 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 151-52. 
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those who met certain government standards. 00 
Equal rights advocates, on the other hand, fought strongly for 
legislation to curtail the traditional freedom of creditors 
''arbitrarily" to select those to whom credit would be granted. 
The Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission 
went so far as to attack the idea of creditworthiness itself, saying 
that use of the "purportedly neutral standard" operated "to pre-
clude a disproportionate number of minorities who are less well-
educated, occupy poorer-paying jobs, and hence have inferior 
credit ratings or no credit record," and was therefore discrimina-
tory. 51 Calling for creditors to make their decisions solely on the 
basis of ability to repay, sponsors of the legislation defined age, 
sex, and race as "extraneous factors of group identification" 
which ought not to play any part in a creditor's decision.52 One 
witness went further and demanded a ban on all characteristics 
which could be shown to be significantly related to any of the 
prohibited criteria.53 Under this view, for example, if home owner-
ship could be shown to be closely correlated with sex, then credi-
tors could no longer employ home ownership as a factor in the 
granting of credit. 
In examining the legislative history of the ECOA to ascertain 
congressional intent in this area, it becomes clear that Congress 
balanced the interests on each side in framing the legislation. 
Representative Leonor Sullivan, perhaps the most zealous advo-
cate of the ECOA, revealed the nature of this compromise when 
she said: 
[W]e recognize that while every person should have equal 
opportunity to qualify for credit on the basis of his or her 
creditworthiness, the business firm which extends credit 
requires and deserves the right to refuse those who cannot 
or will not fulfill the obligation of repayment, and to in-
quire into any circumstances in the applicant's situation 
which would make it impossible for the creditor to apply 
appropriate legal remedies in case of default. 54 
Such a view was reflected in the congressional reports which ac-
11 Brown, supra note 49, et 28. 
•• 1975 House Hearings, supra note 28, et 40 (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Chair-
men, United States Civil Rights Commission). 
12 Statement of Representative Leonor Sullivan in the House of Representatives, Mey 
16, 1974; reprinted in 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, et 15 . 
.. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, et 36 (statement of Issie Jenkins, 
Associate General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). 
"'Id. et 29. 
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companied both the 1974 Act and the 1975 amendments.55 Con-
gress therefore wished to let the creditor retain the right to make 
rational credit-granting decisions, but it defined "rational" to 
exclude consideration of the characteristics listed in the Act as 
prohibited criteria. 
Allied with the concern that creditors not be so limited by the 
provisions of the Act as to damage their ability to make reasona-
ble credit-granting decisions was the question of the proper 
means to determine whether "discrimination" had in fact oc-
curred. The provisions of one of the original pieces of legislation 
in this area, introduced in the House, defined the term as the 
making of "any invidious discrimination,"56 while that of another 
proposed bill defined it as the taking of "any arbitrary action 
based on any characteristic attributable to the sex or marital 
status of an applicant."57 Concern was expressed by various wit-
nesses at the problems likely to arise if discrimination was de-
fined in the bill itself because it might unnecessarily limit or 
expand liability.58 Eventually the decision was made to omit a 
definition from the Act itself.59 The meaning of the term, how-
ever, is stated in the Senate report accompanying the 1974 Act: 
"Discrimination in the extension of credit occurs when a credit 
applicant is not evaluated pursuant to a creditor's ordinary credit 
criteria, but is judged - and frequently denied credit - not 
individually, but because of membership in a class."60 
2. Proof of discrimination under the ECOA - Proving that 
one is the victim of illegal discrimination by a creditor under such 
a definition is no simple task. To make it easier for an ECOA suit 
to be brought, Congress specifically indicated that a test of dis-
crimination created by the courts in the equal employment op-
portunity area was to be applied in ECOA · suits as well. In a 
report on the 1976 amendments to the Act, the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs clearly indicated that 
.. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 3 (1975); S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in (1976] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 403, 405. 
•• H.R. 14856, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(5) (1974). 
57 H.R. 14908, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 702(0 (1974). 
58 See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 72 (appendix to the 
statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Governor, Federal Reserve Board) . 
., A unanimous vote of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee 
on Banking and Currency decided to remove all adjectives before the word "discriminate," 
thereby letting the courts decide on a case-by-case basis which types of credit discrimina-
tion to permit. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 402. See generally 
Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects" Test, 95 BANKING L.J. 241, 
245-48 (1978). 
'° S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1973). 
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the so-called "effects test',' be used by the courts in the evaluation 
of ECOA suits to determine whether discrimination was present.81 
As applied by the United States Supreme Court in such cases 
as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 82 and Albermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 83 this test states that any employment practice or proce-
dure is prohibited if its use has a discriminatory impact upon a 
group which the statute in question is designed to protect. 84 In 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 65 the Court explained the rela-
tive burdens of proof in an employment discrimination case 
brought under Title VII. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to 
show that the practice used by the employer chooses applicants 
in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the appli-
cant pool. Such a showing represents a prima facie case of 
discrimination, requiring a shift in the burden of proof to the 
defendant, who must demonstrate that the practice has "a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question."88 If the 
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then attempt to 
show that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legiti-
mate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' " 87 
Such a showing by the plaintiff would demonstrate that the em-
ployer was using the challenged employment practice as a "pre-
text for discrimination. "88 
More recent cases, however, indicate that the Court may wish 
to make the plaintiffs burden of proof more difficult. In General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 89 the Court ruled that a disability plan 
which denied benefits to those with pregnancy-related disabilities 
11 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CooE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 403, 406. 
12 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
" 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
" In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), for example, black employees of 
the defendant brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e (1976), alleging that defendant's policy of requiring a high school diploma or the 
passing of certain intelligence tests as a condition of employment or transfer to higher-
level jobs consituted illegal discrimination. The Court of Appeals found for the company 
on the ground that the employees had failed to show that the adoption of the employment 
policy was motivated by discriminatory intent. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 
(4th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII outlawed any employ-
ment practice (albeit neutral on its face) that had the effect of discrimination. In short, 
discriminatory intent was held not to be an essen"tial element in plaintiffs' burden of proof 
in Title VII cases. For an analysis of Griggs, see Blumrosen, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: 
Strangers in Paradise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). 
•• 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
n Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
" Id. at 425. 
" Id. Accord, McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
11 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
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did not constitute a showing of sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII.70 In a racial discrimination suit brought against an 
employer as a violation of the equal protection component of the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court ruled that 
the Title VII requirement of a mere showing of discriminatory 
impact was insufficient in constitutional cases:71 "Dispropor-
tionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Consti-
tution. " 72 
Despite this alteration in the burden of proof a plaintiff must 
bear, the congressional intent that the effects test be applied in 
ECOA cases remains.73 The puzzle is to determine to what extent 
a creditor may in effect discriminate against an applicant by 
using either the prohibited criteria themselves or proxy criteria 
so closely correlated with the prohibited criteria as to result in the 
very discrimination which the ECOA was designed to prevent. 
The language of the ECOA is somewhat confusing in this regard, 
because age, marital status, and the receipt of income from a 
public assistance program may all be taken into account, 74 al-
though the Act prohibits their use to discriminate. 75 This lack of 
clarity hinders analysis as to which criteria affect the receipt of 
credit; the fact that applicants in one age group are being denied 
credit more than those in another age group is not easily labelled 
a violation of the Act. 76 Examination of Regulation B77 provides 
a clearer view of what creditors may and may not use in their 
decisions whether to grant credit. 
II. REGULATION B 
Although representatives of the Federal Reserve Board argued 
70 The Court reasoned: "[T]here is no risk from which men are protected and women 
are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." 429 
U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). Plaintiffs therefore 
failed to make the requisite showing of gender-based effect. For criticism of this decision 
and its reasoning, see Comment, General Electric Co. u. Gilbert: A Lesson in Sex Educa-
tion and Discrimination - The Relationship Between Pregnancy and Gender and the 
Vitality of Disproportionate Impact Analysis, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 119 (1977). 
71 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
72 Id. at 242. 
73 See note 61 and accompanying text supra. 
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976). 
,. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). 
71 For example, the use of "any empirically derived credit system which considers age" 
is permitted "if such system is demonstrably and statistically sound" and if "the age of 
an elderly applicant [is not] assigned a negative factor or value .... " 15 U.S.C. § 
1691(b)(3) (1976). 
77 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979). 
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that the ECOA would be better enforced without the promulga-
tion of regulations, 78 Congress chose the Board to create specific 
rules to enforce the broad mandates of the Act. 79 Perhaps the best 
way to become acquainted with the major provisions of Regula-
tion B80 is to observe its impact upon a typical credit transaction. 
To do so, we will follow Ms. X, a 35-year-old divorcee with two 
children, as she enters a bank to obtain an installment loan. 
Regulation B prohibits the bank from making "any oral or 
written statement, . . . to applicants or prospective applicants 
that would discourage on a prohibited basis81 a reasonable person 
from making or pursuing an application. " 82 It is in relation to the 
1
• 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 231 (statement of Jeffrey M. 
Bucher, Governor, Federal Reserve Board). 
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1976). Following passage of the original Act in late 1974, the Board 
began to work on a set of preliminary regulations, which it published in April 1975 in order 
to allow the public an opportunity to comment upon them. 40 Fed. Reg. 18,183 (1975). 
After hearings were held (n May, the Board published revised regulations in September. 
40 Fed. Reg. 42,030 (1975). In response to pressure from business groups, the new regula-
tions limited application of many parts of the Act (as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1691b 
(1976)) to consumer credit. Exempted from various provisions of the Act (such as inquiries 
as to marital status and the requiring of notice as to the main provisions of the ECOA) 
were business, securities, public utility, and "incidental" credit. 40 Fed. Reg. 42,032 
(1975). See also Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity -An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus. 
LAw. 1641, 1644-45 (1976). Criticism of the Board's decision in this matter may be found 
in Note, Equal Credit: Promise or Reality?, 11 HARV. C1v. RTS. - C1v. Lie. L. REV. 186, 
202-03 (1976). The final rules, issued just six days before the Act took effect, reflected 
further pressures placed on the Board by both consumer and creditor lobbyists. 40 Fed. 
Reg. 49,298 (1975). See Fed Shifts Plan on Equal Credit, N.Y. Times, September 8, 1975, 
at 43, col. 5; Federal Reserve Officials Tell Women They Will Revise Rules on Credit Bias, 
N.Y. Times, September 19, 1975, at 30, col. 1. The final regulations included such pro-
consumer provisions as requiring creditors to provide each applicant with a summary of 
the main provisions of the ECOA, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,299-300 (1975), and the forbidding of 
the "discouragement" of applicants on a prohibited basis, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,299 (1975), as 
well as such pro-creditor provisions as further expansion of the aforementioned exemp-
tions for non-consumer credit. 40 Fed. Reg. 49,305 (1975). 
Following passage of the ECOA Amendments of 1976, much the same procedure was 
followed in order to amend the regulations. Proposed changes were published in July 1976, 
41 Fed. Reg. 29,870 (1976), hearings were held in August, and a revised set of regulations 
were published in November. 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123 (1~76). Changes included amendment 
of the ECOA notice requirement so that only rejected applicants need be given the notice. 
41 Fed. Reg. 49,129 (1976). Finally, in early 1977, the current regulations were published, 
to take effect with the ECOA amendments on March 23, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242 (1977). 
80 For an exhaustive examination of the provisions of the current version of Regulation 
B, see Ziino, A Review of the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 1 
(1977). 
•• Prohibited basis means race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital 
status, or age (provided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding 
contract); the fact that all or part of the applicant's income derives from any 
public assistance program, or the fact that the applicant has in good faith exer-
cised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act or any State law upon 
which an exemption has been granted by the Board. 
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z) (1979). 
•• 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1979). 
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information which may be requested in the application itself, 
however, that the regulations have their greatest effect. The gen-
eral rule is that " [ e ]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, 
a creditor may request any information in connection with an 
application, "83 yet the regulations list several exceptions to this 
general rule "so as to prohibit the requesting of information of 
which the sole utility would be to assist in discrimination."84 
The bank may not request that Ms. X inform it of her sex, 85 
race, color, religion, national origin,88 birth control practices, or 
child-bearing intentions or capability. 87 If Ms. X applies for indi-
vidual, unsecured credit, the bank may not ask her marital status 
unless she resides in a community property state or property upon 
which she is relying to repay the loan is located in such a state.88 
Otherwise, the bank may legally ask her only to indicate whether 
she is married, unmarried, or separated. 89 Information regarding 
Ms. X's ex-husband may be obtained only if she is relying on 
alimony, child support, or separate maintenance payments from 
him as a basis for repaying the loan.90 The bank's application 
must inform Ms. X that income from these sources need not be 
disclosed if she does not want it included when the bank deter-
mines her creditworthiness.91 
In evaluating the application of Ms. X, the bank is governed 
by Regulation B's general rule that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided in the Act and this Part [of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions], ... any information [may be used] that the creditor 
obtains, so long as the information is not used to discriminate 
against an applicant on a prohibited basis."92 The significance of 
this provision is explained by the Board's comments to Regula-
tion B, which state that the words "to discriminate" are to be 
read in light of congressional intent that the effects test93 be used 
to measure discrimination in the credit-granting process.94 To 
confirm this interpretation, the Board included a footnote follow-
83 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(h)(l) (1979). 
84 Ziino, supra note 80, at 10-11. 
83 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3) (1979). 
,. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (1979). 
• 87 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4) (1979). 
88 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(l) (1979). 
81 The "unmarried" category "includes single, divorced, and widowed individuals." Id. 
90 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2)(v) (1979). In general, information regarding a spouse may not 
be requested unless the spouse uses the account or is contractually liable upon it. For other 
specific exemptions, see 12 C.F.R. 202.5(c)(2) (1979). 
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(2) (1979). 
•2 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1979). 
" See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra. 
" 42 Fed. Reg. 1246 (1977). 
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ing the provision discussing the effects test and citing the legisla-
tive history supporting its use under the ECOA.95 The Board con-
cluded, however, that the effects test was not well-suited for regu-
latory implementation.98 Congressional intent regarding the test 
was thus implemented solely by the provision quoted above and 
its accompanying footnote. 
In contrast to this general proscription against discrimination, 
the regulations weave a complex pattern of permission and prohi-
bition with regard to the use of age, marital status, and income 
from a public assistance program. Neither Ms. X's age nor any 
money that she may, for example, receive from welfare may be 
taken into account in evaluating her application, 97 with two ex-
ceptions. If the bank has a "demonstrably and statistically 
sound, empirically derived credit system, "98 it may use her age as 
a predictive variable in assessing creditworthiness. 99 If it instead 
has a "judgmental system of evaluating creditworthiness,"ioo it 
may consider her age or welfare payments "only for the purpose 
of determining a pertinent element of creditworthiness."io1 Fur-
ther provisions covering the evaluation of Ms. X's application 
prohibit the bank from (1) using statistics on her likelihood of 
bearing children to predict future diminished income, 102 (2) tak-
ing into account the existence of a telephone listing in Ms. X's 
name, 103 and (3) discounting or excluding from consideration the 
income of Ms. X due to a prohibited basis104 or because the in-
come is derived from part-time employment. io5 The bank may 
consider the likelihood that alimony, child support, or separate 
maintenance payments will be consistently received using speci-
fied guidelines, and to the extent that it determines them to be 
consistent, must count them as income if Ms. X so desires. we 
e& 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.7 (1979). 
" 42 Fed. Reg. 1246 (1977). 
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(i) (1979). 
" Such a system is defined as one: (1) in which the data used to develop the sytem are 
either the complete population or a statistically appropriate sample thereof, (2) which is 
designed to predict the creditworthiness of applicants with respect to "legitimate business 
interests of the creditor," (3) which separates good and poor credit risks "at a statistically 
significant rate," and (4) which is periodicaly reassessed as to its predictive ability using 
proper statistical methods, with appropriate adjustments. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2) (1979). 
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(ii) (1979). 
100 Such a system is defined as any evaluation system "other than a demonstrably and 
statistically sound, empirically derived credit system." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(t) (1979). 
IOI 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(iii) (1979). 
102 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(3) (1979). 
103 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (1979). 
1°' See note 81 supra. 
105 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1979). 
IOI Id. 
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After evaluating Ms. X's application, the bank is bound by 
Regulation B not to refuse to grant her credit, assuming she is 
creditworthy, on any prohibited basis.'07 Several provisions of the 
regulations dealing with the establishment of accounts in Ms. X's 
own name (as opposed to that of her ex-husband) help to fulfill 
one of the purposes of the ECOA, which is to permit a woman to 
open an account and create her own credit history .108 
The other major portion of the regulations likely to affect Ms. 
X is the section requiring the bank to provide notification of the 
action it takes regarding her application for credit. 109 With respect 
to a "completed" application, 110 the bank must notify Ms. X of 
its decision within thirty days after receipt of the "completed" 
application. 111 If "adverse action" 112 is taken regarding an uncom-
pleted application or an existing account, Ms. X must also be 
notified within thirty days. 113 Such a notification (for any of the 
actions listed above) must include all of the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
A statement of the action taken, 
a statement of the basic provisions of ECOA, 114 
(3) the name and address of the relevant federal agency 
that administers compliance concerning the creditor pro-
viding the notification, and 
(4) either: 
(a) a statement of the specific reasons for the 
action taken, 115 or 
(b) a disclosure of the applicant's right to receive 
such a statement of reasons. 116 
Despite the length of Regulation B, creditors and applicants 
alike may be left unsure as to what may be legally asked of an 
applicant and which acts by a creditor constitute discrimination. 
Although the regulations reflect congressional intent that the ef-
107 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(a) (1979). 
108 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b)-.7(d) (1979). 
lot 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1979). 
11• An application is deemed "completed" only if the creditor "has received all the 
information that the creditor regularly obtains and considers in evaluating applications 
for the amount and type of credit requested ... provided, however, that the creditor has 
exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining such information." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(0 (1979). 
111 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(l)(i) (1979). 
112 "Adverse action" is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c), following the definition included 
in the statute at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1976). See note 35 supra. 
"' 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(l)(ii, iii) (1979). 
"' 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). The regulations provide an acceptable statement which 
creditors may use to satisfy this requirement. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(l) (1979). 
111 The regulations provide a sample form. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1979). 
111 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2) (1979). 
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fects test be applied, they do little to implement the test in any 
concrete fashion. 117 This is striking in light of the generally ac-
cepted conclusion that the ECOA represents at least as much as 
a piece of civil rights legislation as a bill to regulate financial 
institutions. 118 An examination of the characteristics of those de-
nied credit and those who perceive such denial as discriminatory 
serves to illuminate the criteria that play an important role in the 
credit-granting process, whether they are formally legal or illegal 
according to the ECOA and regulations. An examination of the 
everyday operation of the credit-granting process may demon-
strate which credit-granting criteria operate to deny credit to 
those for whom the ECOA signalled the end of discrimination. 
Ill. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECOA: REASONS FOR USING 
· A SURVEY 
Several methods are available to examine the effectiveness of 
the ECOA and Regulation B. Most common would be an ap-
praisal of lawsuits brought under the Act. This would permit a 
study of the common types of fact situations which lead to litiga-
tion as well as those provisions of the ECOA and Regulation B 
which give the courts special problems of interpretation. There 
are two problems with this approach, however, one practical and 
one theoretical. First, there are only four reported cases involving 
the ECOA, 119 making it all but impossible to draw any sort of 
117 One witness who testified before the Board at hearings on the amended regulations 
noted: 
The proposal . . . makes no reference to any of the criteria currently in use which 
are directly discriminatory on the basis of race - such as prior home ownership, 
minumum educational requirements, length of residence in the community - all 
of which are commonly used by mortgage lenders. . . .IT the Board feels that it 
has insufficient data concerning the relationship of these criteria to creditwor-
thiness to justify an outright prohibition, there are other approaches to the prob-
lem short of leaving lending institutions and . . . applicants totally without guid-
ance. 
Statement of Roger S. Kuhn, Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University 
School of Law, Dkt. No. R-0013 (August 12, 1976), quoted in Baer, supra note 59, at 253-
254. 
118 Baer, supra note 59, at 255. 
111 National State Bank v. Long, 469 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.J. 1979) (dictum) (the ECOA 
does not preempt state anti-redlining law since it does not specifically include geographic 
location in its list of prohibited credit-granting criteria); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co. of 
California, 453 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (alleged wrongful denial of credit card 
permits actual damages under the ECOA - including compensation for embarassment, 
humiliation, mental distress, and harm to one's reputation caused by the denial - and 
punitive damages arising from a "reckless disregard" of the requirements of the law); 
Smith v. Lakeside Foods, 449 F.Supp. 171 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (credit application containing 
neither designation that indication of applicant's title - Mr., Miss, Mrs., or Ms. - is 
optional nor conspicuous notice of the ECOA required by Regulation B violates the Act 
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generalization. Second, even if there were a larger number of 
lawsuits, the problem would still remain of limiting analysis to 
only those situations deemed serious enough to require a lawyer 
and subsequent litigation. This would doubtlessly exclude a large 
number of credit problems with which the ECOA was designed 
to deal. 120 
Examination of consumer complaints filed with state and fed-
eral agencies, 121 consumer groups, or the Better Business Bureau 
in order to discover whether reports of illegal discrimination were 
frequent represents another method of assessing how well the 
legislation is working. Again, two problems arise. First, it is 
doubtful whether such complaints would be open to public 
inspection under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 122 That 
Act "does not apply to matters that are ... contained in or 
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared 
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervision of financial institutions."123 Even as-
suming that records of such complaints were available, analysis 
would again be limited to those situations which consumers 
bothered to report, thereby biasing the results. Numerous 
studies of consumer complaint behavior demonstrate that the 
"complainer" is not an average type of person. 124 
A third avenue is to examine creditor records in order to assess 
even though applicant sustained no actual damages); Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 
F.Supp. 557 (D.C. La. 1977) (defendant held to have violated the ECOA due to its failure 
to notify plaintiff of reasons it denied her a credit card). Unreported slip opinions involving 
the ECOA include: Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens National Bank of Green Bay, No. 
78-C-671 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 10, 1979) (plaintiff had Seventh Amendment right to jury trial 
under the ECOA); Harbaugh v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, No. 77-C-1985 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 1978) (permissible under the ECOA for creditor 
not to affix courtesy title to applicant's credit card); O'Quinn v. Diners Club, No. 77-C-
3491 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1978) (notification of decision to deny plaintiff credit card failed 
to provide adequate specificity concerning the reasons for the denial where notification 
only stated that applicant "does not qualify"). Note should also be taken of what is 
apparently the first ECOA case to reach the federal courts of appeal. In Markham v. 
Colonial Mortgage Service Co., No. 78-1616 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 1979), 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE 
(CCH) , 97,671 (1979), the court held that the ECOA prevents creditors from refusing to 
aggregate the incomes of two unmarried applicants who are living together where the 
incomes of two similarly situated married applicants would have been aggregated. 
120 See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE Pueuc (1977) for an empirical study of who 
goes to lawyers, for what, and when. 
121 Federal agencies worth examining would be those listed in the Act (15 U.S.C. § 
1691c(a) (1976)). See note 21 supra. 
122 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1976). 
113 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976). 
"' See, e.g., Liefeld, Edgecombe & Wolfe, Demographic Characteristics of Canadian 
Consumer Complaints, 9 J. CONSUMER AFF. 73 (1975); Warland, Herrmann & Willits, 
Dissatisfied Consumers: Who Gets Upset and Who Takes What Action, 9 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 148 (1975). 
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compliance with the Act and the regulations. Although Regula-
tion B requires that monitoring information be submitted by 
creditors to the Federal Reserve Board to allow the Board to 
check compliance with the ECOA, 125 the FOIA exemption men-
tioned above128 would certainly preclude private researchers from 
obtaining access to such records. Further problems, which even 
the Board encounters, include the enormous amount of time and 
money necessary to do even an adequate job of monitoring com-
pliance as well as the possibility that such records are biased in 
favor of creditors. 
Another choice, the one to be employed in this article, involves 
a random sampling of consumers to ascertain their perceptions of 
possible discrimination in the credit-granting process. While this 
involves relying upon non-lawyers to report on what are often 
legal questions, and raises traditional survey problems127 such as 
sampling error, 128 the advantages of such a "grass roots" approach 
far outweigh these potential disadvantages. This method allows 
for the discovery of problems which are ordinarily never brought 
to the attention of a lawyer or bureaucrat and also provides some 
hard data with which to support recommendations for law re-
form.129 Furthermore, the approach stresses how intended benefi-
ciaries of the Act feel; it is these feelings of perceived discrimina-
tion that may well result in potential litigation under the ECOA. 
IV. SURVEY BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL 
MODEL EMPLOYED 
A. Background 
The survey discussed here was sponsored by the Federal Re-
serve Board130 to examine various facets of the consumer credit 
area. 131 A nationwide representative sample of 2563 Americans 
120 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (1979). Such information is used to some extent in preparing the 
Board's annual reports to Congress on how well the ECOA is working. See, e.g., BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EQUAL CREDIT 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE YEAR 1977, at 2-3 (1978). 
"' See note 123 accompanying text supra. 
127 See text accompanying notes 135-45 infra. 
iu See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra. 
121 The need for such hard data was noted in Hays, A Suggested Analysis for Regulation 
of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REv. 335, 366 (1977). 
1
"' The survey was jointly funded by the Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
"' Areas of inquiry covered by the survey include: attitudes toward the use of credit; 
knowledge of interest rates and finance charges on recent loans; attitudes toward and 
experience with credit cards (including credit card billing errors); and a large amount of 
information on housing, major additions and repairs, vehicles, durable purchases, and 
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was interviewed in August-September of 1977 by the Survey Re-
search Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan. 132 One section 
of the questionnaire was specifically designed to elicit responses 
relevant to the operation of the ECOA. 133 
B. Questions Chosen for Inclusion m the Model 
Since the purpose of the article is to assess the effectiveness of 
the ECOA and Regulation B, the questions chosen are those be-
lieved to be the best for locating the presence of adverse credit 
actions of a potentially discriminatory nature. Any predictive 
model involves two types of variables: those which measure the 
phenomenon which the model attempts to explain, called 
dependent variables, and those used to predict or explain the 
phenomenon under investigation, called independent variables. 
recreation and hobby items - information such as the number owned, purchased, and 
how each was paid for. In addition, the survey questioned respondents on their holdings 
of assets, including savings and checking accounts, certificates of deposit, real estate 
holdings, and stocks and bonds. Finally, the survey attempted to discover the processes 
used by consumers in shopping for both products and credit. A summary of the survey 
results is presented in T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (1978), 
published by the Federal Reserve Board. More detailed information on the survey may 
be obtained by writing to the Economic Behavior Program, Survey Research Center, 
University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. A copy is on file with the 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM. 
"' The Survey Research Center's (SRC) national sample of dwellings is a multi-stage 
probability sample with units at different stages selected with probabilities proportional 
to 1970 population and housing unit counts. The sample design contains five stages of 
selection, with the overall probability of selection for any particular housing unit in the 
nation being the sum of all of the probability of selections at any particular stage in the 
process. 
The sampling fraction for this survey was developed from the data contained in the 
following equation: 
Co-operating number of households 
(Estimated total no. of households in U.S.) X (coverage rate) 
X (response rate) 
2563 1 
(74,100,000) X (.95) X (.74) 20,317 
In other words, if the SRC sampling procedure covers 95 percent of all American house-
holds, each respondent represents approximately 20,000 similar households. 
Further information on the sampling methods used in this and other SRC surveys may 
be found in SURVEYS OF CONSUMERS, 1974-1975, at 221-23 (R. Curtin ed. 1976). 
133 Questions relating to the ECOA were of four types: those probing "unfair treatment" 
the respondents had experienced in credit transactions, those asking respondents to tell 
of complaints they had made to someone other than a relative or a friend about unfavora-
ble credit experiences, those asking for the respondent's knowledge of and attitude toward 
a dozen credit-granting criteria (both legal and illegal), and those used in this article, 
which deal with credit refusals and the perceived reasons therefor. 
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In this analysis, the responses to two survey questions were se-
lected as dependent variables to measure the effectiveness of the 
ECOA and Regulation B: the presence of credit refusals or limita-
tions within the past few years, and the perception that such 
refusals or limitations were due to the respondent's race, sex, age, 
or national origin. 
Since this analysis is designed to discover which characteristics 
of credit applicants are associated with credit refusals and per-
ceived discrimination, a large number of factors used by creditors 
in deciding whether to grant credit134 were examined as indepen-
dent, or explanatory, variables. These were of two types: those 
prohibited by the ECOA and Regulation B and those not prohib-
ited. Included in the first group were age, race, sex and marital 
status. Included in the second group were total family income, 
total amount of outstanding installment debt, home ownership, 
whether anyone in the family was employed, whether anyone in 
the family had a checking account, length of time at present 
address, and family size. The model thus attempts to weigh the 
relative influence of some illegal credit-granting criteria against 
some legal criteria to discover (1) whether there are significant 
differences between various types of respondents in the incidence 
of adverse credit decisions based on respondent characteristics 
prohibited by the ECOA, (2) whether those differences persist 
after adjustment for characteristics that creditors may legally 
employ, (3) whether individuals involved in an adverse credit 
decision felt they were discriminated against on a prohibited 
basis, and (4) whether the results from (3) reveal a 
"discrimination-perception-prone" type of individual. 
C. Problems with the Model 
There are four potential problem areas in the use of the current 
model. 
1. Accuracy of the responses - Use of survey results assumes 
some degree of faith in the truthfulness of the respondents ques-
tioned. In this survey, for example, it is assumed that reports of 
credit refusals or limitations correctly represent actual incidents. 
It is also assumed that respondents accurately report their age, 
income, family size, and other objective factors. While there may 
be some doubts as to the accuracy of such reports, 135 survey re-
'" See M. NEIFELD, supra note 47, at 505-15. 
,:so As one author states, 
This concern is evoked by the uneasy feeling that the respondent may, for a 
variety of reasons, engage in a 'presentation of selr that is a subtle mixture of fact 
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searchers have generally concluded that use of such data is relia-
ble.'38 
2. Limitations on the dependent variables - The first depen-
dent variable listed above, self-reported incidence of credit refus-
als or limitations, is intended to represent the concept of "adverse 
action" mentioned in the Act137 and Regulation B. 138 The way in 
which the question is phrased in the survey, 139 however, does not 
meet all of the legal requirements laid out in the regulations for 
inclusion in the category of "adverse actions." 140 The essential 
reason for this discrepancy is that framing the question relating 
to this dependent variable so as to meet all of the regulatory 
requirements would have hopelessly complicated the question, 
thereby making the results of little empirical value. The question 
ultimately used141 attempts to balance comprehensibility to the 
respondent with the legal standards by which "adverse action" 
is defined. 
3. Limitations on the independent variables - The basic 
problem with use of the independent variables (those used to 
predict credit refusals or limitations and perceptions of discrimi-
nation) is the impossibility of including other predictors which 
may have important correlations with the independent variables 
used. For example, analysis of the effects of age on credit refusal 
may well reveal what appears to be widespread discrimination 
against young applicants which may not be accounted for by 
differences in income. The overriding factor here, of course, is the 
applicant's credit history, which the survey does not measure 
directly. Great care should thus be taken in assessing the effects 
of any one independent variable used in the current model be-
cause a number of potentially important predictors, such as a 
detailed credit history and the length of time at one's job, could 
not be included in this analysis as independent variables. 142 
and fiction. The validity of the survey findings is expected to vary with the 
sensitivity of the topic to which the study is addressed. Accordingly, the greatest 
skepticism will attend the reported results of surveys·designed to elicit informa-
tion on matters of sex, religion, politics, and income. These fall under the rubric 
of "one's own personal business." 
Claussen, Response Validity: Vote Report, 32 Pue. OP. Q. 558, 558 (1968-1969). 
1311 See Claussen, supra note 135; Parry & Crossley, Validity of Responses to Survey 
Questions, 14 Pue. OP. Q. 61 (1950). 
137 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1976). See note 35 supra. 
1., 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1979). 
131 The question was: "Have you ever been turned down for credit [or] unable to get 
as much credit as you wanted from a particular lender or creditor in the past.few years?" 
" 0 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1979). 
"
1 See note 139 supra. 
"' Although no detailed credit history was used as an independent variable, its effect 
may be partially represented by the total amount of outstanding installment debt in-
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4. Sampling error - Although SRC scientifically selects a 
sample of the popultaion so that it reflects population character-
istics as accurately as possible, 143 the very process of choosing a 
limited number of households to represent the entire population 
necessarily involves what is called sampling error.1" Sampling 
error represents the difference between the actual population 
value 145 as to a particular measured response and the result found 
using only a sampling of the population. Such error in a survey 
of this size is represented in Table 1, where the chances are 95 in 
100 that the population value being estimated by the sampling 
actually falls within the listed range on the table. The degree of 
error depends upon the sample percentage, as the presence of the 
various rows in Table 1 indicates. For example, Table 2 reveals 
that 35% of those who had lived at their present address two years 
or less reported credit refusals or limitations. According to Table 
1, the actual population value for this subgroup lies somewhere 
between about 32.5% and 37.5% - using an interpolation of the 
"30 or 70" and the "50" percentage rows in the table. 
TABLE 1 
APPROXIMATE SAMPLING ERROR FOR SAMPLE SIZE OF 2300 
Percentages reported 
50 
30 or 70 
20 or 80 
10 or 90 
5 or 95 






Adapted from SURVEYS OF CONSUMERS, 1974-1975, at 229 (R. Curtin ed. 1976) 
eluded in the model. Similarly, the length of time at one's current address may serve as a 
partial indicator of the length of time at one's current job. 
"' See note 132 supra. 
'" For a fuller description of this statistical concept, see T. WoNNACO'IT & R. WoNNA-
CO'IT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 300-01 (1969). 
- '" "Actual population value" refers to the number that would be found if the survey 
covered every household in the population. 
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TABLE 2 
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF 
REPORTED CREDIT REFUSALS OR LIMITATIONS 
[VOL. 13:1 
Proportion of Respondents Who 
Reported Credit Refusal or 
Limitation Within Past Few Years 
All Re1m2ngents 2286 
.A&:!: 

















Total Family Income 
Less than $10,000 695 
$10,000-19,999 712 
$20,000 and over 579 





$2,000 and over 495 






Length of Time at Present Address 
0-2 years 779 
3-5 years 293 
6-10 years 370 
11-20 years 394 
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TABLE 2 (cont'd) 
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Proportion of Respondents Who 
Reported Credit Refusal or 
Limitation Within Past Few Years 
Reported MCA Adjusted 
Proportiop Proportion 
liBYS: B Cb~s:kin&: As:s:1u.1nt1 
Yes 1873 .19 .20 
No 392 .24 .17 
F11mily Size 
1 466 .18 .18 
2 724 .15 .18 
3-4 752 .24 .21 
5-7 316 .23 .22 
8 or more 28 .32 .29 
TABLE 3 
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF 
PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION IN CREDIT REFUSALS 
All R~sn2nd~nt§ 431 
~ 

















IotBl F11milv lns:om~ 
Less than $10,000 168 
$10,000-19,999 148 
$20,000 and over 89 
Proportion of Respondents Who 
Reported Belief that Credit was 
Refused/Limited Due to Illegal 
Criteria (age, sex, race/national 
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TABLE 3 (cont'd) 
Proportion of Respondents Who 
Reported Belief that Credit was 
Refused/Limited Due to Illegal 
Criteria (age, sex, race/national 
~ 111:ildn, mai: stat1,111) 




None 159 .40 .31 
$1-499 59 .31 .29 
$500-999 35 .31 .33 
$1,000-1,999 41 .27 .30 
$2,000 or over 137 .28 .37 
An:rone in Famil:r Eml!lo:reg? 
Yes 360 .30 .31 
No 71 .48 .41 
Q:w:n H2m1: 1 
Yes 219 .24 .30 
No 211 .43 .36 
Length of Time at 
Prgsi:nt Address 
0-2 years 265 .37 .32 
3-5 years 55 .16 .24 
6-10 years 45 .16 .26 
11-20 years 27 .26 .41 
21 years or more 39 .54 .53 
HBl'.!: Iii Chi:s:kin&: A.1:1:21,mt? 
Yes 340 .30 .32 
No 89 .44 .36 
[11,mil:r l;!ize 
1 83 .55 .37 
2 103 .40 .41 
3-4 173 .24 .28 
5-7 64 .17 .28 
8 or more 8 .25 .35 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION 
ANALYSES IN TABLES 2 AND 3 a 
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Credit Refusals Perceived 
or Limitations Discrimination 
Predict.ors (!leta} (beta} 
Age .219 .216 
(1) (1) 
Race .062 .029 
(7) (11) 
Marital status .051 .193 
(8) (2) 
Sex .023 .172 
(11) (3) 
Total family income .095 .068 
(5) (7) 
Total outstanding installment debt .128 .066 
(3) (8) 
Family employment .026 .074 
(10) (6) 
Home ownership .075 .085 
(6) (5) 
Time at present address .157 .125 
(2) (4) 
Have checking account .049 .033 
(9) (10) 
Family size .118 .053 
(4) (9) 
Multiple R-SQRD .167 .257 
(Adjusted) (.155) (.197) 
Cases 2286 431 
a Numbers in parentheses indicate the rank order of the beta statistics. 
V. SURVEY RESULTS 
A. Explanation of the Statistical Analysis 
The results are presented in Tables 2 through 4. Tables 2 and 
· 3 present the proportions of respondents reporting credit refusals 
or limitations in Table 2 and of respondents perceiving discrimi-
nation in such adverse action in Table 3 in one column and 
"Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) Adjusted Proportions" 
(to be explained infra) in the other. For example, looking at the 
"Reported Proportion" column in Table 2, we see that of the 263 
respondents aged 18 to 25, 43% reported one or more credit refus-
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als or limitations within the past few years. This contrasts with 
only 4% of those respondents aged 65 or older. Looking again at 
Table 2, we see that of those respondents who owned their own 
home, only 15% reported unfavorable credit decisions, while 31 % 
of non-home owners reported such problems. Overall, as the top 
row·in Table 2 indicates, 20% of the 2286 respondents146 told inter-
viewers that they had been denied credit or unable to obtain the 
desired amount within the past few years. 
The "MCA Adjusted Proportion"147 column in Tables 2 and 3 
gives an estimate of what the reported proportion would have 
been had the subgroup in that row been exactly like the total 
population with respect to all other predictor variables. For ex-
ample, in Table 2, the 34% MCA adjusted proportion for those 
aged 18 to 25 represents the 43% reported proportion adjusted for 
the effect of all the other independent variables listed along the 
left side of the table. The effect of such adjustment is dramati-
cally demonstrated by examining the reported and MCA ad-
justed proportions for the independent variable "Total family 
income" in Table 3. Simply by looking at the reported propor-
tions, it would seem that income has an enormous impact upon 
perceived discrimination, with those of low income much more 
likely to report that their credit refusal was due to an illegal 
criterion than those of higher income. As the numbers in the 
MCA column indicate, however, this is not due to income, for 
these differences all but disappear when adjustment is made for 
age, education, race, sex, and other factors associated with in-
come that are included among the independent variables. 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for each of the dependent 
variables. The beta statistic represents the net relationship be~ 
tween the independent and dependent variables after adjustment 
is made for the influence of all of the other independent (predic-
tor) variables. 148 More useful than examination of the actual beta 
values themselves is their ranking, which is indicated by the 
numbers in parentheses under each value. In predicting the incid-
'" The difference between the 2563 respondents who were surveyed and the 2286 respon-
dents labelled "all respondents" in Table 2 is due to 277 respondents who were eliminated 
from analysis for any of a number of reasons, such as failing to answer a question or 
replying "don't know" to a question. 
'" For a complete description of Multiple Classification Analysis and its uses, see F. 
ANDREWS, J. MORGAN, J. SONQUIST & L. KLEM, MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS: A RE-
PORT ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION USING CATEGORICAL PREDICTORS 
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDREWS]. For an adaption of the MCA program 
compatible with many computers, see INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN, OSIRIS ill, VOLUME I: SYSTEM_ AND PROGRAM DESIGN 575-87 (1973). 
'" For a more complete description of the beta statistic, see ANDREWS, supra note 147, 
at 47-49. 
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ence of credit refusals or limitations us1ng the eleven explanatory 
variables listed, Table 4 reveals that age is ranked as the best 
predictor, with time at present address second and total amount 
of debt third. The three best predictors of perceived discrimina-
tion are, in order, age, marital status, and sex. 
The numbers in Table 4 labelled "Multiple R-SQRD" repre-
sent the proportion of variance in the dependent variable ex-
plained by variations in the predictor variables. 149 Thus, using all 
eleven predictors together explains approximately 17% of the var-
iance in adverse credit actions and approximately 26% of the 
variance in perceived discrimination. The rest of the variance, 
which cannot be explained by the combined use of these predic-
tors, is due to other factors not included in the analysis and to 
error. 150 
B. What the Tables Reveal 
1. Credit refusals and limitations - As indicated by both 
Tables 2 and 4, age plays the most important role in predicting 
what type of person is most likely to report being refused credit 
or being limited in the amount granted. As reported earlier, 43% 
of those aged 18 to 25 report such refusals, but the percentage 
decreases as the age of the respondent increases, to a low of only 
4% of those aged 65 or older (Table 2): Even after adjustment is 
made for the influence of factors such as income, home owner-
ship, and length of time at present address, the age effect persists, 
as the beta ranking in Table 4 confirms. As regards the other 
illegal criteria, Table 2 reveals a troublesome difference between 
the reported refusal rate for whites and nonwhites, even after 
adjustment is made for relevant legal factors such as employment 
and income. Little difference, however, may be attributed to mar-
ital status or sex, which rank eighth and eleventh, respectively, 
out of the eleven predictors. 
Of those factors that creditors may legally employ in deciding 
whether to grant credit, the time that the respondent had lived 
at his or her present address was the best predictor of reported 
refusals (Table 4). Generally, the longer the time at one address, 
'" For a general discussion on the nature of this statistic and what it helps to explain, 
see E. BABBIE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 307-09 (1973); T. WoNNACOTI & R. WoNNACOTI, 
supra note 144, at 1-6. 
150 The numbers in parentheses immediately under the "Multiple R-SQRD" numbers 
are the squared multiple correlation coefficients adjusted for degrees of freedom and 
represent the percentage of variance explained by the predictor variables aggregated after 
corrections for capitalization or chance in fitting the model to the particular sample being 
analyzed. ANDREWS, supra note 147, at 27-28. 
130 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 13:1 
the _ less likely a respondent was to report being denied credit 
(Table 2). The total amount of outstanding installment debt 
ranked next among the legal criteria, with a somewhat confusing 
pattern to be found in Table 2. Adjustment for all predictors 
relegated the other legal criteria to relatively unimportant predic-
tive status (Table 4). 
2. Perceived discrimination - Age is the most important pre-
dictor overall of perceived discrimination (Table 4). Young people 
were more than twice as likely as the elderly to report believing 
that the credit they desired and could not obtain was withheld 
due to some illegal factor (Table 3). Marital status and sex 
ranked second and third in terms of their predictive ability 
(Table 4), with non-married respondents and women much more 
likely to report that their personal characteristics were responsi-
ble for their credit denials (Table 3). Race had a relatively insig-
nificant impact on the perception of discrimination (Table 4), as 
reflected by the fact that 33% of both the white and nonwhite 
subsamples reported such a perception (Table 3). All of the other 
independent variables show little influence, excepting for the 
higher incidence of perceived discrimination among those who 
had lived at one address for a long time (Table 3). 151 
3. Summary of results - Several things stand out among the 
results. First, the young clearly report being turned down for 
credit more often than older respondents and they are more likely 
than their elders to view such action as arising from a discrimina-
tory cause. Only 20% of the respondents, on average, indicated 
that they had been refused credit within the past few years, while 
34% (after adjustment) of those aged 18 to 25 so replied. One third 
of those refused credit indicated that they thought age, sex, race, 
national origin, or marital status was involved in the creditor's 
decision to deny them credit, while 45% of the youngest age group 
so reported (Table 3). 
Considering the congressional concern about discrimination 
against the elderly in the credit market, this survey reveals little 
such behavior. Only 9% of the respondents aged 65 or older re-
ported being refused credit (Table 2), 152 while only one in five of 
m This result is difficult to explain under the model's theory. It may be that long-time 
residents at one address who are denied credit are forced to attribute such a denial to a 
personal characteristic because they simply cannot imagine another reason why they 
would be turned down. 
m This apparent lack of credit discrimination against the elderly may be due solely to 
a propensity among those aged 65 or older to apply for credit less often, thereby reducing 
the likelihood of credit refusals. It may also support the claims made by several creditors 
at hearings on the ECOA that there is little credit discrimination against the elderly 
because they are such excellent credit risks. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hear-
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those refused credit saw the refusal as discriminatory (Table 3). 
Sex discrimination seems absent from the results (Table 2), but 
many women denied credit clearly see the denial as one linked to 
illegal criteria (Table 3). Race presents the opposite situation, 
with the difference in credit refusals revealed in Table 2 not 
viewed by nonwhites as particularly discriminatory (Table 3). As 
for marital status, creditors appear to deny credit more often to 
non-married applicants than to married ones, even after adjust-
ing for differences in income, employment, and other relevant 
factors (Table 2). Approximately half of the non-married respon-
dents denied credit identified an illegal criterion as the reason for 
such denials (Table 3). 
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
A. Youth Discrimination in the Granting of Credit 
As indicated above, 153 there is a serious problem in the granting 
of credit to those between the ages of 18 and 25: a larger propor-
tion of this group than any other reports being denied credit and 
nearly half views it as arising from the age factor. It would seem 
that the ECOA offers these rejected applicants no legal recourse. 
Despite its sweeping language that "[i]t shall be unlawful for 
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant . . . on the 
basis of . . . age, " 154 it is clear from other provisions of the Act, 155 
Regulation B, 158 and the legislative history157 that Congress in-
tended that creditors be able to deny credit to young applicants 
solely because of their age. This is due largely to what is perceived 
as the legitimate interest of the creditor in selecting applicants 
who possess suitable "credit histories" which reflect the willing-
ness and ability of the applicant to repay loans. One creditor has 
commented: 
There is a clear relationship between age and ability to 
pay. Younger people have not had the time to accumulate 
possessions or capital, or acquire sizable incomes. They 
need to purchase practically everything - home, furni-
ture, applicances, and insurance. Moreover, their wants 
ings, supra note 15, at 415-41 (statement of Richard F. Kerr on behalf of the National 
Retail Merchants Association). 
113 See Part V 8 3 supra, and Tables 2 and 3. 
1" 15 U.S.C. § 169l(a)(l) (1976). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 169l(b)(2) (1976). 
1
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2) (1979). 
157 H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). 
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and needs are greater because young people are economi-
cally more active in our society. They are likely to have 
young children to support. 158 
The overgeneralizations in this statement are alarming. If abil-
ity to repay is the touchstone of creditworthiness, then it must be 
asked why there should be a greater incidence of reported credit 
refusals among younger respondents after adjustment for income, 
employment, and home ownership. The answer is obvious: young 
people are being denied credit because they are young, not be-
cause their income is low, because they have not lived in the area 
long enough, or because they rent their residence. While it may 
be granted that a rational creditor would ignore youth as a factor 
in a good credit risk, much the same statement could have been 
made twenty years ago about a divorced woman who showed 
promise as someone willing and able to repay her loan. Just as 
we no longer allow gender or marital status to serve as convenient 
proxies for a careful assessment of the real creditworthiness of an 
applicant, so we should not let age serve any longer. To allow age 
to remain a valid credit-granting factor only perpetuates the ster-
eotype of young borrowers as poor credit risks, permitting irra-
tional prejudice against all young applicants to remain unchal-
lenged. The ECOA and Regulation B should be amended to re-
quire creditors to base their decisions solely on rational factors 
such as income, so that credit discrimination against the young 
will be as impermissible as it now is against the old. 
B. Perceived Discrimination Against Women 
Although there seems to be little difference between the re-
ported incidence of credit refusals of men and women, those 
women who have experienced unfavorable credit decisions are 
quite likely to attribute the outcome to their gender. This special 
sensitivity may be due to the fact that the ECOA was created and 
publicized widely as a "women's bill," bringing a great deal of 
publicity to the problems faced by women in obtaining credit. 159 
There seems little need for remedial legislative action absent 
greater evidence of actual discrimination. Creditors should be 
, .. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 423 (statement of Richard F. 
Ken on behalf of the National Retail Merchants Association). 
••• Popular magazines helped to publicize the problem of credit discrimination against 
women and the response of the ECOA. See Myerson, How to Fight for the Credit That is 
Due You, REDBOOK, September 1974, at 76; What Women Should Know About Credit, 
AM. HOME, September 1975, at 6; Women Move Toward Credit Equality, TIME, October 
27, 1975, at 63. 
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warned, however, that many women applying for credit may be 
prone to viewing rejections as evidence of sex discrimination. 
Careful attention must be paid to providing a full and accurate 
statement of the reasons for taking any adverse action against a 
female applicant so as to prevent such perceptions from develop-
ing into costly litigation. 
C. Marital Status Discrimination 
Evidence of discrimination based on marital status found in 
the survey is somewhat disheartening in light of the Board's enor-
mous efforts to comply with the spirit of the ECOA by including 
so many provisions in Regulation B designed to prevent such 
discrimination. Indeed, there are so many sections of the regula-
tions devoted to the prevention of discrimination based on mari-
tal status that it is doubtful that creditors who are unable to 
afford large legal staffs can comply with the many nuances of 
Regulation B. The problem here may lie in the lack of education 
among creditors and consumers alike as to the provisions of the 
Act and the regulations, education which would serve to alleviate 
problems other than those relating to marital status as well. 
1. Educating the creditors - Recognizing these problems, the 
Board has undertaken an "advisory visit program" for member 
banks, to assist creditors in understanding many of the compli-
cated provisions of the regulations. Evidence gathered from the 
examination of such banks indicates that ignorance of the law's 
many parts is "the single most significant obstacle to full compli-
ance."180 A recent report of the Board to Congress reveals that the 
program is working well. 181 
2. Educating the consumers - Responses to questions in the 
survey reveal widespread ignorance of those criteria which credi-
tors may not legally employ in the granting of credit. 182 As indi-
cated below in Table 5, only 59% of the respondents knew that 
race was an illegal criterion, while that figure for nonwhite 
respondents was less than 50%. Only 52% overall and 43% of 
women recognized sex as an impermissible factor to use in 
granting credit, while only one in five respondents knew marital 
status to be illegal. Fewer than one in five labelled age an illegal 
criterion, possibly because of confusion over whether "age" re-
ferred to discrimination against the elderly or to age discrimina-
tion generally. 
, .. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, supra note 1_25, at 4. 
Ill Id. 
112 Such ignorance is no doubt due in part to the time when the survey was con-
ducted-just six months after the ECOA amendments took effect. 
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TABLE 5 
PERCEIVED ILLEGALITY OF VARIOUS CREDIT-GRANTING CRITERIA 
Percent indicating they thought it was 
ilh:iml m&: cregi tor to use : 
Age Race Sex Marital status 
All re11112ndent11 18% 59'/, 53'/n 20'/, 
[&mill'. income 
Less than $5000 12 37 30 12 
$5,000 - 9,999 15 54 48 17 
$10,000 - 14,999 17 63 58 18 
$15,000 - 19,999 20 68 61 2-1 
$20,000 - 24,999 24 70 67 26 
$25,000 or over 26 75 66 29 
Ag!l Qf resn2nd1mt 
18-25 15 70 63 22 
25-34 25 80 72 27 
35-44 20 63 55 25 
45-54 21 60 55 22 
55-64 15 51 47 14 
65 or older 9 33 28 8 
;Edycation of r!l§l!2lld!lnt 
8th grade or less 8 27 19 6 
Some high school 15 46 39 13 
High school graduate 16 60 57 20 
Some college 25 77 70 28 
College graduate 27 84 79 32 
~ 
White 18 61 55 20 
Black 17 46 42 18 
Other 15 50 41 14 
~ 
Male 21 64 58 20 
Female 13 51 43 20 
The demographic factor which clearly distinguishes respon-
dents on their knowledge of these criteria is, not surprisingly, 
their level of education. This is a hopeful sign, however, for it 
seems to indicate that educational efforts are likely to succeed. 
Based on this assumption, the Board has issued a series of 
consumer-oriented pamphlets designed to inform consumers in 
layman's terms what the ECOA permits and prohibits and where 
aggrieved applicants can go for help with their problems. 183 Rep-
resentatives of the Board are also participating in a number of 
seminars and presentations designed to give greater publicity to 
•0 See, e.g., BoARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, THE EQUAL CREDIT 
OPPORTUNITY Ac:r AND WOMEN (1977). 
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consumer credit protection laws, including the ECOA. 184 
An earlier version of Regulation B185 required creditors to pro-
vide a summary statement of the ECOA188 to all applicants, 
whereas the current regulations only require that rejected appli-
cants be provided such a statement. 187 Further educational efforts 
' might well include a return to the former provision, so that all 
who apply for credit are made as fully aware of their rights under 
the ECOA as they now are of interest rates under the Truth in 
Lending Act. 188 
D. Race Discrimination and the Effects Test 
Even after adjustment is made for a number of factors pertain-
ing to race, for example, and length of time at present address, 
the reported refusal rate for nonwhites is still higher than it is for 
whites. If this reported difference represents an actual difference, 
i.e. if creditors actually deny credit more often to nonwhites than 
to whites, all other things being equal, how might it be decided 
whether such conduct constitutes discrimination under the 
ECOA? Since congressional intent was that the effects test be 
applied, it is necessary to imagine how a court might apply that 
test in a credit discrimination suit. 
The Federal Reserve Board has suggested a scenario for such a 
suit. 189 In the first step of a three-step process, the plaintiff would 
attempt to show that a certain standard used for deciding to 
whom credit is granted, although neutral on its face, results in the 
denial of credit more often to one group than another. Following 
the Albemarle Paper Co. procedure, 170 this would constitute a 
prima facie showing of discrimination. The burden would then 
shift to the creditor to demonstrate that the credit standard is 
customarily applied to all applicants, and that the standard has 
a manifest relationship to creditworthiness. The plaintiff would 
then have the option of moving to the third step, which, analogiz-
ing to Albermarle, would involve attempting to prove that an 
alternative credit standard would have a lesser adverse impact 
'" BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 125, at 18-19. 
1" 40 Fed. Reg. 49,302 (1975). 
111 Such a statement is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b) (1979). 
111 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1979). 
111 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1976). "By 1977 levels of [interest] rate awareness reached 54.4 
per cent for closed-end credit from institutional sources and 64.7 per cent and 71.3 per 
cent for retail revolving credit and bank credit-card credit respectively." T. DURKIN & G. 
ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 5. 
'" Division of Consumer Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 
FED. RES. BULL. 101 (1977). 
11
• See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra. 
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upon the affected group and that the alternative would serve the 
creditor's legitimate interests as well as the original standard. 
The Gilbert decision, 171 however, casts doubts on how seriously 
the Supreme Court views the effects test as applied in Albemarle. 
Given the lack of guidelines in Regulation B as to precisely how 
the effects test applies in the credit area, "creditors and their 
lawyers are justifiably concerned about the prospect of the effects 
test being applied." 172 The Board suggests that those few credi-
tors who use "demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically 
derived credit systems" will have little trouble, since the very 
existence of the system provides a rebuttal to alleged discrimina-
tion, in that it demonstrates the relationship of the criteria to the 
creditor's legitimate interests. 173 For the majority of creditors who 
use a "judgmental system," however, the Board is not so ~ptimis-
tic. It merely suggests that lending institutions carefully examine 
their practices in the credit-granting process to ensure that they 
are "rational" and that factors are used which have "a manifest 
relationship to creditworthiness. " 174 
Whether the Board should attempt to end this confusion by 
specifically regulating the precise items which may and may not 
be used in the granting of credit is, however, still open to doubt. 
There is of yet no judicial interpretation of the effects test in this 
area. Since the test itself was created by the courts, it can be 
argued that it would be best to wait for a judicial decision as to 
how the test is to apply under the ECOA. In addition, as one 
commentator has made clear, 175 there are vast differences be-
tween the employment and credit arenas which may cause a strict 
interpretation of the regulations to reduce the amount of avail-
able credit, thereby harming the very people the ECOA was de-
signed to assist. 
E. Administrative Enforcement 
1. Current enforcement efforts - Within the past three years, 
a number of agencies have taken steps which indicate that the 
ECOA may be vigorously enforced even if private actions remain 
scarce. The first Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent order 
171 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See text accompanying notes 
69-72 supra. 
172 Division of Consumer Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, supra note 169, at 107. 
'" Id. 
'" Id. 
175 Comment, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR 
L. REv. 633 (1976). 
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issued under the Act178 came in February 1977 against a Chicago 
mail-order house which had discriminated in several ways on the 
bases of sex and marital status. 177 In November 1978, the FTC 
announced that it had reached a settlement with Bloomingdale's 
department store whereby the store paid a civil fine of $50,000 
and agreed to contact all rejected applicants whose rights might 
have been violated and invite them to reapply. The store was 
accused of failing to consider the income of credit applicants 
derived from alimony, child support payments, and part-time 
employment, as well as neglecting to inform rejected applicants 
of the precise reasons for the actions. 178 The FTC enjoined Mont-
gomery Ward in a consent judgment from failing to provide a 
statement of the specific reasons applicants were denied credit. 179 
More specifically, the company was prohibited from failing to 
disclose several factors actually considered in taking adverse ac-
tions, from giving false or misleading reasons for adverse action 
that the company actually did not use in its credit scoring system, 
and from giving general reasons for adverse action rather than 
specific ones. 180 Most recently, in the first action under the ECOA 
involving a finance company, the Commission issued a consent 
order against Westinghouse Credit Company requiring redress for 
alleged past violations of the Act and implementation of an edu-
cational program to prevent future violations. 181 
The Justice Department has also acted under the authority 
given it by the 1976 amendments to the ECOA. 182 In April 1978, 
it filed its first action under the Act, alleging that a Dallas real 
estate developer refused to sell home sites or make mortgages 
available to blacks.183 A court order was sought to enjoin the de-
171 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) , 98,065 (1978), referring to In the Matter of Aldens, 
Inc., FTC Consent Order, File No. 772 3017, February 14, 1978. 
177 Aldens violated no fewer than eight regulations and was ordered to cease and desist 
from the following: 
Id. 
discrimination against credit applicants on account of sex or marital status, and 
employing these factors in a credit scoring system contrary to Regulation B; 
failing to recognize the receipt of regular child support payments as income when 
evaluating credit applications; requesting the name of the applicant's spouse 
upon application for an unsecured credit account in a non-community property 
state; failing to preserve certain credit records including reports from credit re-
porting agencies; and neglecting to provide rejected credit applicants with specific 
reasons within the specified time period. 
11• Bloomingdale's Settles in Equal Credit Case, Ann Arbor News, December 21, 1978, 
at B-4, col. 1. 
171 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) , 97,732 (June 15, 1979). 
,so Id. 
1• 1 5 CoNS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 288 (September 18, 1979), at 2. 
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (1976). 
,a 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 252 (May 5, 1978), at 6. 
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fendant from further violations of the Act and to require the 
developer to correct the lingering effects of its alleged discrimina-
tory practices. 184 The case was settled in November 1978 by entry 
of a consent decree providing for injunctive and affirmative re-
lief.185 The Department also brought suit in May 1978 against a 
Pennsylvania kitchenware company, alleging that it had discrim-
inated against blacks, Hispanics, and married persons in install-
ment purchases by applying different standards of creditwor-
thiness to different demographic subgroups. 188 In addition to in-
junctive relief, the suit seeks to make the company take corrective 
measures including the payment of monetary damages. 187 These 
cases are typical of the others brought by the Justice Department 
in the past two years. 188 
The Federal Reserve Board continues to emphasize examina-
tions of member banks as the chief weapon in its potential en-
forcement arsenal. 189 Governor Jackson of the Board has informed 
IM Id. 
185 REPoRT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT FOR THE 
YEAR 1978, reprinted in 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), 97,790 (1979). 
111 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 253 (May 18. 1978), at 5. 
111 Id. 
111 A case filed in May 1978, United States v. Sumner Advertising Agency (W.D. Tex.), 
alleges that a marketing company, two of its employees, and two land developers violated 
the ECOA by discouraging blacks, Hispanics, persons on public assistance, and persons 
over 65 years of age from applying for financing the purchase of residential land. A consent 
decree was filed in September 1978 against three of the five defendants who had ceased 
marketing residential property, with the proviso that if any of the three were to resume 
the residential property business, the federal government would have to be notified and 
seminannual reports submitted demonstrating compliance with the ECOA. As of Febru-
ary 1979, the case was still pending against the remaining two defendants. REPORT OF THE 
ATJ'ORNEY GENERAL, supra note 185. A case filed in October 1978 alleged sex and marital 
status discrimination by a mortgage company in selecting applicants to be given mortgage 
loans. In United States v. Citizens Mortgage Co. (E.D. Va.), a court-approved consent 
decree filed simultaneously with the complaint provided for injunctive relief, application 
of uniform and specific lending standards spelled out in the decree, a program for educat-
ing employees of the defendant about their responsibilities under the decree and the 
ECOA, notice to real estate brokers who deal with the defendant of non-discriminatory 
loan standards now used, and public notice of the same. The decree applies to defendant's 
ten offices in five states. Id. Most recently, in January 1979, a consent decree was an-
nounced by the Department for a suit brought against a Kentucky bank, which perma-
nently enjoins the bank from discriminating in favor of male loan applicants, discounting 
the income of married women in loan applications, ignoring sources of income other than 
from employment, and failing to provide a written notice of denial to loan applicant. 5 
CONS. CRED. GumE (CCH), Report No. 271 (January 25, 1979) at 2-3. 
111 Between April 1977 and August 1978, Board examiners found nearly 18,000 possible 
violations of Regulation B among inspections of 861 state member banks, almost half 
relating to nonconforming application forms. Another quarter related to incomplete notifi-
cations of reasons for credit denials. The major substantive violations of Regulation B 
concerned improper requests for the signature of a nonapplicant spouse. "A good number 
of these institutions have now been brought into compliance after further clarification as 
to what Regulation B requires. The Federal Reserve Banks are dealing with the others on 
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Congress that the agency's enforcement program "seeks to effect 
voluntary compliance whenever possible," although he promised 
that the Board would take "appropriate administrative action" 
(including referral of some matters to the Attorney General) 
"when warranted." 190 Jackson also stated that the Board "could 
decide to make the identity of the [offending] institutions pub-
lic" if repeated violations occur and voluntary compliance is not 
obtained. 191 
2. Enforcement guidelines proposed - Another sign of the 
growing commitment to making the ECOA work came when five 
enforcing agencies192 proposed uniform guidelines for administra-
tive enforcement of the ECOA, Regulation B, and the Fair House-
ing Act, 193 the general objective of which is to require corrective 
action from violators of the regulations and to promote future 
compliance. 194 For example, if a creditor runs afoul of the prohibi-
tion against discouraging applications on a prohibited basis, 195 the 
proposed policy suggests that "[t]he creditor will be required to 
solicit credit applications from the discouraged class through af-
firmative advertising ... subject to review by the enforcing 
agency." 198 Even more severe is the proposed action to be taken 
against those creditors who employ discriminatory elements in 
their credit evaluation systems. A creditor found to have discrim-
inated in this manner "will be required to re-evaluate, in accord-
ance with a non-discriminatory written loan policy, all credit 
applications rejected during a period of tim_e to be determined by 
the agency."197 In addition, all applicants rejected by the creditor 
under the discriminatory system must be invited to reapply, and 
refunds furnished to them of "any fees or costs paid ... in 
connection with their original applications."198 
As of November 1979, these guidelines had been sent to an 
interdepartmental "Examination Council" made up of represent-
atives of the five agencies responsible for their enforcement. This 
a case-by-case basis." Statement of Philip C. Jackson, Jr., Governor, Federal Reserve 
Board, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the 
House Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, September 15, 
1978, reprinted in 64 FED. REs. BULL. 742, 743-44 (1978). 
''° Id. at 744. 
"' Id. 
112 The agencies involved were the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit Union Administration. 
"' 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). 
"' 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 (1978). 
115 See note 81 supra for the Regulation B definition of "prohibited basis." 
'" 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 at 29,257 (1978). 
117 Id. 
111 Id. 
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Council will rewrite the guidelines in accordance with their po-
tential feasibility as determined by, for example, bank examiners 
for the Federal Reserve Board checking with various types of 
regulated institutions. 199 The guidelines will "probably not be 
submitted again for public comment," and will go into effect 
sometime in early 1980.200 
3. Greater enforcement initiative required - At this stage, it 
is difficult to assess the performance of those agencies charged 
with enforcing the ECOA. According to the Federal Reserve 
Board's 1978 report to Congress, agency action in this area has 
come largely in response to consumer complaints, which have 
been few in number. 201 In his 1978 report to Congress on the 
ECOA,202 the Attorney General suggested three possible explan-
nations for the lack of complaints and lawsuits:· consumer igno-
rance of the law;203 the willingness of creditors to change a prac-
tice brought to their attention by enforcement agencies, thereby 
avoiding a lawsuit; and the tendency of creditors to alter credit 
standards so as to grant credit to rejected applicants who com-
plain to the creditor, thereby allowing the underlying discrimina-
tion to continue.204 
Whether enforcement agencies should continue to act only 
upon receipt of consumer complaints is highly questionable. Al-
though Congress intended that private actions be the primary 
enforcement tool against creditor violations of the ECOA, 205 it is 
also clear that the tripartite division of enforcement among pri-
vate citizens, the regulatory agencies, and the Attorney General 
was believed necessary to ensure the strong enforcement of the 
Act. 208 Mere reactive measures fail to reflect the vigorous efforts 
which those who passed the Act thought were necessary to deal 
with equal credit violations. 
1" Telephone interview with Staff Attorney, Division of Consumer and Community 
Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 
1979). 
200 Id. 
:tat BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, supra note 125, at 2. 
2a2 ATI'ORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUN-
ITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, reprinted in 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,040 (1978) 
[hereinafter referred to as 1977 ATTORNEY GENERAL REPoRT]. 
• See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra and Table 5 for evidence of such igno-
rance. 
204 1977 ATI'ORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 202. 
2a1 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d SeSB. 13 (1976), reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& Ao. NEWS 403, 415. 
'"' "Since discrimination is inherently insidious, almost presumptively intentional, yet 
often difficult to detect and ferret out, the Committee believes that strong enforcement 
of this Act is essential to accomplishing its purposes. The bill therefore provides enforce-
ment opportunities of three kinds." Id. 
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Support for this position is found in the survey. Respondents 
were asked if they had ever been treated unfairly in any credit 
transactions, and if so, whether any action was taken. 207 The 388 
respondents who reported being treated unfairly and who took 
action took a total of 535 actions, 61.5% of which involved com-
plaining to the creditor.208 In only thirteen cases did a consumer 
complain to a public third party such as the government or the 
media about unfair treatment, 209 reflecting the paucity of com-
plaints received by federal enforcement agencies.210 Although the 
problems most often mentioned by those who believed that they 
had been treated unfairly involved a credit refusal or limitation, 
not a single respondent complaining to a public third party men-
tioned the problem of credit availability. 211 The number of cases 
is too small to allow generalizations, but this result certainly 
suggests that the agencies charged with enforcing the ECOA fail 
to receive a representative sampling of consumer credit com-
plaints.212 To permit these agencies to act only when prodded by 
consumer complaints thus risks exclusion of many equal credit 
violations, a result contrary to the vigorous eradication of unfair 
credit practices that the ECOA was designed to ensure. 
Despite this conclusion, few can doubt that the ECOA enforce-
ment agencies generally lack the resources required to institute 
aggressive investigations of creditor practices in their respective 
areas to discover potential violations of the Act and Regulation 
B. If such resources were made available, other agencies could 
create educational enforcement programs similar to the success-
ful one of the Federal Reserve Board. 213 Congressional recognition 
of the expertise of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice, 214 which formed the basis for inclusion of that agency in 
the ECOA enforcement arsenal, 215 suggests a more forceful role for 
the newly reorganized Housing and Credit Section of the Divi-
sion.218 Creditors would thereby be put on notice that their activi-
207 The questions were: "In your opinion, have you ever been treated unfairly in your 
credit transactions? What was the problem? Did you try to do anything about this? What 
did you do?" 
,.. T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 29. 
,.. This figure represents 2.5 percent of all actions taken. Id. at 31. 
21
• See text accompanying notes 201-04 supra. 
111 T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 29. 
112 Id. at 30 . 
.,. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text supra. 
211 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CooE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 403, 415. 
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691e(g), (h) (1976). 
"' 1977 AITORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 202. 
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ties would be as closely monitored as are those of employers and 
those in the housing field. 
CONCLUSION 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B represent 
an attempt to ensure that all creditworthy individuals are pro-
vided with equal access to the economic necessity of credit. While 
Congress intended that the law be a balancing of consumer and 
creditor interests, examination of survey results indicates that 
current pactices may not be achieving that goal. The young, the 
unmarried, and the nonwhite all report having experienced unfa-
vorable credit decisions more often than the rest of the sample, 
with young and female respondents likely to view such adverse 
decisions as the result of creditor concern with factors which the 
law requires they ignore. 
Changes in the law and regulations, of course, can alter only 
creditor practices and not unfounded consumer perceptions. Fur-
thermore, the results of a single survey serve only to reveal poten-
tial problem areas at the time the survey was conducted. The 
suggestions for reform offered here represent changes designed to 
respond to both the problems suggested by the survey and con-
gressional intent as to how such problems should be handled. 
Whether the ECOA and Regulation B prove effective in allowing 
access to the credit market regardless of immutable characteris-
tics can only be discovered by further examination, including 
surveys, designed to measure the effectiveness of such reform. 
-James A. Burns, Jr. 
